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allowing the Souvalls to attempt to sell the corporate assets for 
$200,000 and thus salvage their homes from foreclosure. (R. 
253-4, 437). After proper disclaimer by the Bankruptcy 
Court (R. 256, Exhibit 2-P), many assets were sold to third 
parties, and the money was applied towards payment of the 
outstanding indebtedness. (R. 253-7). In all instances the 
Souvalls found buyers and negotiated the sales price, and the 
lenders approved and received the proceeds. 
During the above course of events, the Universal Leasing 
Company was merged with Rockwell Exploration Company, 
giving birth to a new company known as Universal Rockwell. 
Under the terms of the merger, it was possible to exchange 
10,000 shares of Universal Leasing Company stock for 4,530,-
000 shares of stock in the new corporation. (R. 259-261, 291). 
On February 16, 1970, North Star Marine Sales Company was 
merged into the new company. (Exhibit 27-P). Defendant 
S. Craig Hunter learned about this new proposed merger early 
in February, 1970. He attended the meeting of the merging 
corporation representatives (Mark Eames of Rockwell and 
Jerry Timothy of North Star Marine Sales) on February 12, 
1970. (R. 604, 730). They were interested in getting Hunter 
involved because he had a securities dealer's license, and they 
wanted some brokerage support, somebody to make a market 
in the stock and tell brokers about it. (R 606). Mark Eames, 
President of Universal Rockwell, told him about the 10,000 
shares of Universal Leasing stock that had been pledged to the 
Bank by the Souvalls, and indicated to him that these might 
be available for purchase. (R. 426, 607). Mark Eames gave 
Hunter two financial statements of Universal Leasing, one 
dated March 31, 1969 and one dated November, 1969 (Ex. 
230, R. 607). 
3 
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Hunter first approached the Bank and later the Souvalls 
and inquired about purchasing the stock. (R. 257). Souvalls 
sent him to the Bank for information. Donald M. Bennett, an 
officer at the Bank, showed Mr. Hunter two Universal Leasing 
Company financial statements, both dated August 31, 1969. 
(R. 343, Exhibits 13-P and 14-P). At that time Mr. Bennett 
explained to Hunter that the two statements, although both 
daed August 31, 1969, showed different total amounts and 
were somewhat inconsistent; that he didn't know which one 
was right. (R. 373-4, 403). He urged Mr. Hunter to deter-
mine the value of the stock for himself. (R. 375). Hunter was 
also cautioned to audit the company himself or otherwise ob-
tain additional financial information about the leasing com-
pany. Hunter did not tell the Bank officers of his prior meet-
ings with Eames and Timothy. (R. 375, 848). The financial 
statements came into Don Bennett's possession not from the 
Souvalls but from the Spanish Fork branch of the Bank, where 
Universal Leasing had some loans. (R. 355, 399). The Sou-
valls did not know that Bennett had the financial statements 
of Universal Leasing. Hunter never asked the Souvalls for 
any information concerning the value of Universal Rockwell 
stock. (R. 425). John Langeland, Senior Vice President of 
the Bank urged Hunter on a later occasion to check the books 
to make sure the financial statements were correct. (R. 853-4). 
All of Hunter's questions were answered about the stock. (R. 
405). 
When Hunter first came into the Bank to inquire about 
purchasing the stock, he was asked by Bank representatives 
where he was going to get the money to buy the stock. He 
answered that he had enough New York securities to take care 
4 
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of it. (R. 320, 343, 344, 348 and 465). He also explained 
that he was trying to gtt control of the leasing company. (R. 
274). 
Since the stock in question was an investment-type stock, 
and could be sold only on a restricted basis, Mr. Hunter went 
to great lengths to have the restrictions removed and have the 
security changed to a free-trading stock. This was done through 
Attorney Alex Walker of Salt Lake City, Utah, who prepared 
an opinion stating that a change of circumstances regarding 
the Souvall investment had occurred and that they should now 
be free to" sell the stock on an unrestricted basis. (R. 236-5, 
339, 348, 412, Exhibit 32-P). Particular attention should be 
given to Exhibit 32-P. 
On March 9, 1970, the plaintiff corporations and guar-
antors entered into a Contract of Sale with defendant S. Craig 
Hunter (Exhibit 3-P), wherein Hunter agreed to pay the sum 
of $133,500.00, payable by cashier's check or bank draft, for 
the 10,000 shares of stock and certain other assets included 
in the sale. The contract recited that Universal Rockwell had 
consented to the elimination of the restrictions upon the stock 
(Exh. 3-P, R. 285). On the closing date, Hunter was unable 
to make immediate payment as agreed therein. (R. 612). He 
explained to the sellers that he had to liquidate his New York 
securities to get the money. (R. 344, 277). 
On March 25, 1970, Hunter went to the Bank and re-
quested that the stock be delivered to him prior to payment, 
stating that the funds were being made available and that he 
would soon be able to pay the full amount of the contract. 
(R. 342-4). After some deliberation, the Bank released the 
5 
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stock to him without payment on his assurance that the money 
would soon be forthcoming. A few days later, he signed a 
Promissory Note in the sum of $133,500.00, evidencing his 
indebtedness under the contract. (R. 345, Exhibit 11-P). 
Throughout this period, the principals in the merging 
corporations were extolling the great advantages of the pro-
posed and completed mergers of the companies involved there-
in. (Exhibit 27-P). Hunter had met with the officers of the 
companies and was informed of the developments in this re-
gard (R. 604-6). On February 27, 1970, Mr. Mark Eames, 
President of Universal Leasing, told Donald M. Bennett that 
the stock of the new corporation was worth five cents a share 
and that the 10,000 shares of leasing company stock could be 
exchanged for 4,500,000 shares in the new corporation. (Ex-
hibit 16-P). Hunter planned to make a market in the new 
corporation's stock prior to contacting the Souvalls or the 
Bank. (R. 730). He commenced selling it for ten cents a 
share. (R. 802). 
The same day that Hunter received the stock, he in fact 
exchanged it for 4,530,000 shares of stock in Universal Rock-
well, which he then sold, pledged or traded for other various 
items of value. (R. 782-796). Subsequent thereto, Hunter 
and his attorney repeatedly assured the Bank and the Souvalls 
that Hunter would make full payment under the contract. On 
one occasion he paid $9,000.00 on the total obligation, but 
he never made any other payments on the contract. Some pay-
ments were made by the Souvalls when they later sold assets 
conveyed under the agreement to Hunter, but over $80,000.00 
remained due and owing at the time of suit. Defendant never 
6 
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returned any of the stock or stock of comparable value to the 
Bank. He brought in some restricted lettered stock which was 
not free trading stock, in the name of a third party. (R. 369). 
On June 15, 1970, suit was filed to recover for the un-
paid balance under the contract and under the Promissory 
Note. In his Answer to the Complaint, Hunter claimed for the 
first time that he had been misled by the plaintiffs and the 
Bank. (R. 276). He filed a Counterclaim asking for damages 
for fraud under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 61-1-
22(1) (b) against the plaintiff corporations and the Souvalls 
(Tr. 56), and common law fraud against the Bank. (Tr. 36). 
At the trial, Hunter claimed that his failure to pay was 
bottomed on his later knowledge that the Universal Leasing 
Company was not in good financial condition and that the 
stock was worthless. He claimed that plaintiffs had failed to 
inform him of this fact during their negotiations. However, 
the evidence reveals that as late as September 1970, the defend-
ant was trying to sell the stock to other people. (R. 796). In 
reality it appears that Hunter found out that his stock was of 
little value when he learned of the recision of the merger of 
Universal Rockwell and North Star Marine Sales, Inc. on May 
27, 1970. (Ex. 29-P). 
Hunter admitted that he had no New York stock or other 
securities; (R. 466) that he owned no New York securities 
when he went to the Bank to purchase the Universal Leasing 
Company stock. (R. 711). 
As above noted, in the Answer and Counterclaims, Hunter 
alleged common law fraud against the Bank and statutory 
fraud under Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 
7 
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61-1-22(1) (b) against the Souvalls and the corporations. At 
the conclusion of the trial, he attempted to change the basis of 
his defense against the Bank to include statutory fraud. The 
Court denied his motion, and the matter was submitted to the 
jury on fact interrogatories (R. 186). The jury totally re-
jected defendant's fraud theories and sustained the positions of 
the plaintiffs and the Bank on all factual issues. Defendant 
has filed timely appeal from the Court's Judgment. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK WAS NOT 
THE AGENT OF THE PLAINTIFF CORPO-
RATIONS OR GUARANTORS IN THE SALE 
OF UNIVERSAL LEASING COMPANY STOCK. 
In his brief on appeal, defendant argues that the Zions 
First National Bank, intervening plaintiff in this action, be-
came the agent of the plaintiffs for the sale of a security under 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 61-1-22(1) (b) (1953) be-
cause it required express consent of the stock owner before re-
leasing any information about the stock in question. The evi-
dence quoted in support of this novel theory shows only that 
the Bank refused to convey any information until it was prop-
erly authorized by its customer to do so. No other testimony 
in the record supports defendant's claim of an agency relation-
ship between the Bank and the plaintiffs. 
In Hunter's Counterclaim he specifically alleges that the 
officers of the Bank gave a financial statement to him when 
they knew that the stock described in the Complaint was worth-
less, and when they knew that the Universal Leasing Company 
8 
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was in poor financial condition, and when they knew that 
the financial statements which they gave to the defendant were 
inaccurate, misleading and false. The jury found as a fact that 
none of these allegations were true (Tr. 186). The Counter-
claim against the Souvalls is different in that it alleges that 
the Souvalls as sellers of the stock did so in violation of U.C.A., 
6l- l -22-( l ) (b) . The difference is significant. In one case, 
we are dealing with common law fraud (a deliberate misrep-
resentation) and in the other we are dealing with a statutory 
violation (omission to state a fact necessary. . . ) . 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant made 
his first attempt to bring the Bank under the provisions of the 
statute by submitting proposed instructions on the question 
of statutory fraud against the Bank under the agency theory (R. 
136, 140, 147). The Court properly rejected this attempt 
to change the basic issues of the trial and refused to instruct the 
jury on the agency question. Only the defense of common law 
fraud against the Bank had been raised during the pleading 
stages of the case. The trial was conducted by Court and coun-
sel in accordance with those pleadings. Attorneys for the Bank, 
had until that time, no reason to attempt to meet the de-
fense of statutory fraud under agency principles, and the pro-
posed change would have placed them in a very unfavorable 
and unfair position when the matter was submitted to the jury. 
The Court properly rejected the defendant's belated attempt 
to assert a statutory defense against the Bank. 
Even if an earlier assertion of agency fraud had been 
made in the case, the Trial Court would have had no reason to 
instruct on the question of agency because the evidence would 
not support such an instruction. The testimony quoted by de-
9 
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fendant Hunter in his brief, even viewed in a light most favor-
able to him, does not sustain his position. It reveals only that 
the Bank officials insisted that Hunter obtain the consent of 
its customers before releasing information about their prop-
erty that was found in its files. The background evidence in 
the case is necessary to fully understand the position of the 
Bank and to place the testimony quoted in defendant's brief 
in its proper perspective. 
The true relationship between the plaintiffs and the Bank 
was that of debtor and creditor. The Bank and the SBA had 
loaned $200,000.00 to the plaintiffs and plaintiffs had de-
faulted in their repayment. When foreclosure was imminent, 
plaintiffs requested the right to dispose of the pledged assets 
on a voluntary basis rather than under forced sale (R. 253-4, 
437). They were attempting to salvage their homes which 
had been pledged as security on the loan. Only the price of 
sale of the assets was subject to the approval of the Bank and 
the SBA (R. 253-4). Under the loan arrangements, the 
10,000 shares of Universal Leasing Company stock had been 
delivered to the Bank for security purposes. The Bank did not 
solicit Hunter to buy the stock and did not represent its value. 
The evidence clearly shows that the Souvalls, not the Bank, 
were sellers of the stock. When Hunter approached the Sou-
valls to obtain information about the stock, he was referred 
to the Bank, who required him to obtain consent from the 
Souvalls before releasing information out of its files. This re-
quirement did not make the Bank an agent for the Souvalls 
in selling the stock. Bank officials were merely exercising due 
and proper caution required by its own rules to protect the 
confidential nature of its dealings with its customers. Good 
sense on the part of Banks requires this procedure. If the 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
officers had indiscriminately passed out information in its 
files without the customer's consent, it might have been leav-
ing itself open for lawsuits of another nature. The precaution-
ary measures practiced in this instance did not give rise to a 
responsibility of agency as alleged by the defendant on this 
appeal. 
The Courts have never extended agency principles to 
include the circumstances under which the Bank released in-
formation to Hunter under the facts of this case. In 2 C.J.S., 
Agency, Section 17, we find that the creation of the relation 
of principal and agent rests in the intention of the parties and 
must be determined from the facts and circumstances of a 
particular case. Without intention on the part of the principal 
to appoint and intention on the part of the agent to accept 
the appointment, there is no agency. We find from 3 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Agency, Section 2, that one of the prime elements of 
an agency relationship is the existence of some degree of con-
trol by the principal over the conduct and activities of the 
agent. 
Utah law follows these concepts. In Continental Bank 
and Trust Company v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 384 P.2d 796 
at 800 (1963), the Supreme Court of Utah pointed out that 
an agency relationship is bottomed on the consent of the 
parties. The Court's words are as follows: 
". . . [A}gency is defined by the American Law 
Institute Restatement of Agency 2d, Section 1, as fol-
lows: 
* Agency is the fiduciary relation which results 
from the manifestation of consent by one person to 
another that the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control, and consent by the other so 
to act/ " 
11 
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There is no indication in our case that the Bank would be sub-
ject to the control of the Souvalls or that the Bank could bind 
the Souvalls in any way. Evidence of such a binding relation-
ship between the Bank and the plaintiffs is simply nonexist-
ent in the present state of the record. 
The Utah Court also held in Wilkerson v. Stevens, 16 
Utah 2d 424, 403 P.2d 31 (1965), that proof of existence 
of the alleged principal and agent relationship requires show-
ing of a reasonable basis to support a finding that the alleged 
agent and the undisclosed principal so intended, and includes 
at least some knowledge and intention of participation in the 
transaction by the alleged principal. That case also held that 
one who claims an agency relationship must necessarily bring 
forth the facts to show the existence thereof. Defendant has 
utterly failed to do so in this case, so his allegations in regard 
to this issue were properly rejected by the Court. 
It should also be noted that the statute makes an agent 
of the seller jointly and severally liable when he "materially" 
aids in the sale. The evidence in this case forecloses any in-
struction to the jury on this defense because whatever part 
the Bank played in the sale was totally immaterial to its execu-
tion. Its representatives showed two financial statements to the 
defendant and then pointed out to him that they were totally 
inconsistent with one another. (R. 373-4, 403). He was re-
peatedly advised to check the books and make sure that the 
financial statements were correct. (R. 643-4). Hunter was 
anxious to free the stock for sale and go forward with the 
purchase (R. 424). The Bank's activities made no differ-
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ence in the sale. Hunter knew what he wanted to do and 
needed no urging to obtain the stock. He was acting on his 
own, and if there was folly, it resulted from his own activities. 
Although the Court dismissed the Counterclaim alleging 
fraud against the Bank and the plaintiffs, the Judge permitted 
the jury to consider defendant's fraud claim as an affirmative 
defense. The following interrogatories and the jury's response 
thereto are shown in the record: 
11. Do you find that the officers and agents of Zions 
First National Bank made a representation of a 
material fact to the defendant, S. Craig Hunter: 
Answer: No 
12. Do you find that the representation so made was 
false. 
Answer: No 
13. Do you find that the representation was known 
by the Bank's officers or agents to be false when 
it was made or that such statement was made 
recklessly with knowledge that there was insuf-
ficient information upon which to base such 
statement? 
Answer: No 
14. Do you find that such statement was made with 
fraudulent intent for the purpose of inducing 
the defendant to act and rely thereon? 
Answer: No 
From the above we note that the trier of fact determined 
from the evidence that defendant had not sustained the bur-
den of proof by clear and convincing evidence on his allegations 
of fraud. It is inconceivable that the jury would have changed 
13 
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its opinion if the Court had reserved the Counterclaims for 
later decision. Under any theory, the jury's decision would 
have foreclosed a Judgment in defendant's favor. 
The only way the Bank could have been charged under 
the statute for fraud is in an agency capacity with the plain-
tiff corporations. The statute cannot be made applicable to 
the actions of the Bank unless such an agency relationship is 
shown. There is no evidence in the record to affirm and sup-
port the assertions of the defendant on this appeal, and the 
Trial Court should be sustained in its refusal to include the 
Bank under the provisions of Section 61-1-22(1) (b) Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. 
POINT II 
THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
LOAN APPLICATION (PROPOSED EXHIBIT 
7-D) WAS NOT MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES 
OF THIS CASE AND WAS PROPERLY EX-
CLUDED BY THE COURT. 
During the trial, defendant Hunter asked that the loan 
application submitted by the plaintiffs to the Small Business 
Administration in 1969 be received in evidence (Exhibit 7-D). 
Plaintiffs objected on the grounds that the exhibit was not 
relevant or material to the issues of the suit, and the Judge 
sustained that objection (R. 298-304). Defendant asserts on 
this appeal that the ruling was erroneously prejudicial to his 
case. 
It should be remembered that the action now before the 
Court seeks to recover the unpaid balance on a contract of sale 
for 10,000 shares of stock in the Universal Leasing Company 
and other assets described in the Contract of Sale (Exhibit 
14 
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3-P). The Contract was dated March 9, 1970. The Small 
Business Administration application (Exhibit 7-D) was pre-
pared in June 1969 (Exhibit 32-P, Page 4 ) . It was part 
of the preliminary negotiations between the plaintiffs, the 
Bank and the Small Business Administration, which culminat-
ed in a participation loan to the plaintiffs in the sum of $200,-
000.00. Although the course of events that led up to the pres-
ent action may have begun with the loan, those facts are only 
incidental and preliminary to the issues of this case. It is not 
contended that the SBA loan was invalid or improper in any 
regard. It is admitted by all the parties that the entire amount 
of the loan was due and payable before defendant purchased 
the stock. The guarantors were attempting to pay off the loan 
without losing their homes, and the sale of stock to Hunter 
was part of their attempt to liquidate the assets without loss 
of their personal property. Of course, the borrowers and the 
Bank were working together in some ways to recover the de-
faulted loan balance, but this concerted effort was no evidence 
of fraud or deceit on the purchaser of the stock. It is reasonable 
that the Bank would be interested in doing everything legally 
possible to collect the amount due on the defunct loan. A 
contrary position would be sheer folly on its part. 
Except as stated above, the application for the original 
loan is totally unrelated to this action. It was prepared almost 
a year before the present cause of action ever arose. Any 
omissions or misstatements therein could not have been made 
to induce the defendant to purchase the leasing company stock 
because no such purchase was even anticipated until after the 
loan was in default. Even if the exhibit revealed that the bor-
rowers didn't follow the Small Business Administration pro-
cedures in obtaining the loan in 1969, such facts would be im-
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material to the issues before the Court. The preparation of the 
loan application was far too remote to have any probative value 
in this case. Conditions of the respective companies and per-
sons involved in the loan had markedly changed from the 
time the loan application was submitted, and it had no value 
for purposes of this case. 
Appellant argues further that the Exhibit should have 
been admitted to show that an officer of the Bank was also an 
officer of the borrowing Corporation. There is no dispute on 
this point between the parties. It was readily admitted by both 
the plaintiffs and the Bank that John Langeland, Senior Vice 
President of the Bank and T. Bowering Woodbury, a Vice 
President of the Bank, were both stockholders of the borrowing 
corporations and served as Directors and members of the 
Executive Committees of both corporations (R. 80-84). The 
proposed exhibit was not necessary to prove this point to the 
jury. 
Appellant also asserts that the exhibit was material and 
relevant to establish the identity and value of the assets sold to 
him under the Contract of Sale. The assets purchased by de-
fendant were clearly described in the Contract of Sale (Exhibit 
3-P) and no reference need be made to the loan application 
to establish their identity. In fact the loan application might 
even cause some confusion in this regard. 
It is true that mention was made of the SBA loan applica-
tion during the testimony of Peter Souvall, but the contents of 
that application were not discussed. The only discussion was 
directed to the existence and execution of the loan application 
itself. The plaintiffs made no attempt to discuss the contents 
of the loan application or introduce the exhibit in evidence (R. 
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245-50). Comments of counsel in their opening statements 
are not evidence and do not provide a basis for introduction of 
evidence in a lawsuit. For this reason, the estoppel argument 
asserted by the appellant in his brief would not apply to this 
situation. 
The Courts have generally held that the exclusion of evi-
dence as irrelevant or immaterial either because it is too re-
mote, too uncertain or too conjectural, is a matter largely with-
in the discretion of the Trial Court, and a ruling thereon will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion clearly 
appears. See 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, Section 251. In the 
matter now before the Court, there was no abuse of discretion 
and Exhibit 7-D was properly excluded from the evidence be-
cause it was not probative of any fact in issue. On the con-
trary, it would have opened a Pandora's Box of inquiry that 
would have unnecessarily lengthened the already long and 
burdensome matter before the Court. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCT-
ED THE JURY ON THE LIABILITY PROVI-
SIONS OF THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES 
ACT. 
Defendant-appellant contends in Point III of his Argu-
ment on appeal that the Trial Court committed prejudicial 
error in its instructions numbers 17 and 19 when it failed to 
instruct the jury that liability under the Utah Uniform Securi-
ties Act can be predicated upon omissions as well as misrepre-
sentations or mere half-truths. This contention is clearly with-
out merit. The record discloses that the Trial Court properly 
defined the bases of liability under the Uniform Security Act 
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in its charge to the jury. The Court's instructions, when con-
sidered as a whole and in connection with the evidence re-
ceived during the trial, indicate that liability under the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act may be predicated both upon misrep-
resentations and certain types of omissions. 
Section 61-1-22(1) (b) of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act provides that: 
61-1-22(1) Any person who 
Jt Jt Ji. Ji, 
W TV" TV" TV* 
(b) offers or sells a security by means of any 
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to 
state a material act necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading (the buyer not 
knowing of the untruth or omission,) and does not 
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and 
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of the untruth or omission, is liable to the per-
son buying the security from him . . . . [Emphasis 
supplied} 
It is clear that, as defendant-appellant contends, this 
statute renders unlawful any attempt to sell a security by means 
of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to 
state a material fact in connection with a sale of a security or 
offer to sell same. However, the omission to state a material 
fact must be an omission to state a material fact made m con-
nection with certain other statements made, which said mate-
rial fact is necessary in order to make the other statements not 
misleading. Moreover, the omission, to be actionable, must be 
misleading in the light of the circumstances under which it 
occurred. In other words, the omission must make other state-
ments appear misleading before a violation occurs. This inter-
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pretation of the language of the statute relating to omissions 
has been offered in a substantial number of cases construing 
identical language of federal law. Hughes v. S.E.C., 174 F.2d 
969 (D.C. Cir., 1949; Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.Supp. 
808 (D.C. Del., 1951); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th 
Cir., 1961); In Re American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d 
47 (10th Cir, 1963), reversed 379 U.S. 594 (1965); Kohler 
v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir, 1963); Trussell v. United 
Underwriters, 228 F.Supp. 757 (D.C. Colo. 1964); S.E.C. v. 
Franklin Atlas Corp., 154 F. Supp. 395 (D.C.S.D. N.Y, 
1957); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir, 1967), cert, 
denied 390 U.S. 951 (1968). 
The record clearly indicates that the Trial Court instructed 
the jury that liability under the Uniform Securities Act may 
be predicated upon such omissions. In fact, both instructions 
numbers 15 and 17 indicate that liability under the Utah Uni-
form Securities Act may be predicated upon certain types of 
omissions, and instruction 17 clearly sets forth the circum-
stances under which an omission may be regarded as a viola-
tion of that Act. Instruction No. 15 (R. 165) reads as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
You are instructed that Section 61-1-22 of the 
statutes of State of Utah provides that "Any person 
who offers or sells a security by means of any untrue 
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a 
material act necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading (the Buyer not know-
ing of the untruth or omission), and who does not 
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and 
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of the untruth or omission is liable to the per-
son buying the security from him . . . 
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Further, Instruction No. 17 (R. 167) reads: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
You are instructed that the defendant claims that 
the plaintiffs, S & F Supply Company, The Dinner 
Table, Inc., and Andrew W. Souvall and Peter W. 
Souvall, individually and as agents and officers of the 
corporate plaintiffs, knowingly and willfully and with 
intent that defendant rely thereon and be deceived 
thereby, induced defendant to purchase the said shares 
of stock by failing to represent to defendant certain 
material facts necessary in order to make the statements 
made by plaintiffs to defendant, in light of the circum-
stances in which they were made, not misleading, which 
material facts are: 
(a) That Universal Rockwell, Ltd. was in very 
serious financial difficulty, and 
(b) That because of such difficulty, plaintiffs 
then expected the stock of said corporation to become 
valueless within a short period of time. 
Before you can consider whether or not the plain-
tiffs omitted to state any material fact, you must first 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that certain 
statements about the particular subject were made by 
the plaintiffs to the defendant, and that in the light of 
the circumstances under which these statements were 
made, it then became the duty and burden of the plain-
tiffs, as sellers of the securities, to state further facts 
and make a full and complete disclosure of all material 
facts known to them. Thus, the statute makes it fraud-
ulent to state any untrue statement of a material fact 
with intent to deceive or make any statements that 
were half-true, as far as they went, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made. (Empahsis 
supplied}. 
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The above instructions, when considered as a whole and 
in connection with the evidence in the instant case, clearly 
indicate that liability under the Utah Uniform Securities Act 
may be predicated upon certain types of omissions. Moreover, 
it is clear that the challenged instructions rigorously defined 
for the jury the circumstances in which, under the Utah Uni-
form Securities Act, liability would attach for such omissions. 
This Honorable Court, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States as well have repeatedly held that in reviewing the 
propriety and correctness of instructions, the Appellate Court 
should read the challenged instruction in connection with other 
instructions that have been given and consider the adequacy 
of the charge as a whole, disregarding errors and omissions 
contained in individual instructions. Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. 
Padgett, 236 U.S. 668, 35 S.Ct. 481, 59 L.Ed. 777 (1915); 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 at 156, 87 S.Ct. 
1975, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1094 (1967); Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 
631, 237 P.2d 834 (1951); Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 
312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937); Redd v. Airway Motor Coachlines, 
104 Utah 9, 137 P.2d 374 (1943); Brunson v. Strong, 17 
Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966); Rims v. Pacific Finance 
Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 P.2d 990 (1964). 
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, a case in which 
certain individual instructions were challenged as erroneous 
and prejudicial, Justice Harlan, speaking for the U.S. Supreme 
Court, said: 
The impact of a jury instruction "is not to be 
ascertained by merely considering isolated statements 
but by taking into view all the instructions given and 
the tendencies of the proof in the case to which they 
could possibly be applied.,, Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 
v. Padgett, 236 U.S. 668, 672. 
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Similarly, in Startin v. Madsen, supra, a case in which 
there were numerous assignments of error relating to the giv-
ing and to the refusal to give instructions, Justice Crockett, 
speaking for this Honorable Court, said: 
"It was the duty of the court to cover the theories 
of both parties in his instructions. Martineau v. Han-
son, 47 Utah 549, 155 P. 432; McDonald v. Union 
Pacific R. Co, 109 Utah 493, 167 P.2d 685. If the 
instructions are considered as a whole, as they must 
be, Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654; 
Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, 104 Utah 9, 
137 P.2d 374, the court adequately discharged this 
duty and fairly presented the issues to the jury." (237 
P.2d 834 at 836). 
In the instant case, the instructions of the Court, when 
taken as a whole and considered in connection with the evi-
dence, clearly counsel that a violation may be predicated upon 
certain enumerated types of omissions as well as misstatements 
of material facts. Thus, defendant-appellant's claim that the 
Trial Court failed to properly instruct the jury on this point is 
without merit. 
Finally, the argument of the defendant-appellant on this 
point is totally based upon an assumed fact that is not sup-
ported by the record. Before the statute can apply to the Bank, 
it must be shown that the Bank was a seller of stock. As dis-
cussed in another part of this brief, the Bank in this instance 
was not selling the stock in question. The stock was being 
sold by the Souvall brothers at their request and for their bene-
fit. The charge of omissions is made against the non-selling 
Bank only. Defendant-appellant does not claim that the Sou-
valls made any omissions as to any material fact. This charge 
is made against the Bank only. As heretofore discussed, the 
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Bank was neither the seller of the stock nor the agent of the 
Souvalls for purposes of such a sale. For this reason the Court 
had no reason to go into a detailed explanation of the statute 
as it related to omissions of fact. The statute applied only to 
the Souvalls, who had made no such omissions. Therefore, no 
instruction on this point was necessary in this case. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S 
STATUTORY DEFENSE AND CONCERNING 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
Defendant-appellant contends in Point IV of the Argu-
ment portion of his brief that the Trial Court committed 
prejudicial error when it improperly instructed the jury con-
cerning defendant's statutory defense and concerning the bur-
den of proof. This contention will not withstand even the most 
perfunctory analysis. 
A. 
Defendant-appellant argues that the Trial Court's failure 
to permit the defendant to amend his pleadings to allege a 
separate statutory fraud action and defense against the inter-
vening plaintiff Bank, and that the Trial Court's concomitant 
failure to instruct the jury concerning defendant-appellant's 
alleged defense of statutory fraud under Section 61-1-22(1) 
(b) of Utah's Uniform Securities Act, was prejudicial error. 
This Honorable Court and the United States Supreme 
Court have repeatedly held that instructions are properly given 
by the Trial Court only in those instances where an issue upon 
which an instruction is sought is properly supported by evi-
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dence. Where there is no basis in evidence for an issue to be 
covered by an instruction, it is improper to give said instruc-
tion. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. Whitacare, 242 U.S. 169, 
37 S.Q. 33, 61 L.Ed. 228 (1916); Bird v. U.S., 187 U.S. 118, 
23 S.Ct. 42,47 L.Ed. 100 (1902); Coffin v. United States, 162 
U.S. 664, 16 S.Ct. 943, 40 L.Ed. 1109 (1896); Keyser v. Hitz, 
133 U.S. 138, 10 S.Ct. 290, 33 L.Ed. 531 (1890); Olsen v. 
Warwood, 123 Utah 111, 255 P.2d 725 (1953); Griffin v. 
Prudential Life Ins. Co., 102 Utah 563, 133 P.2d 333 (1943); 
Jensen v. Utah Railway Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349 (1927). 
In Griffin v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, the Supreme 
Court of Utah enunciated the general rule in this jurisdiction 
governing the giving by the Trial Court of instructions to the 
jury: 
"It is no doubt error to give instructions on 'a state 
of facts which there is no evidence tending to prove, 
or which the undisputed evidence in the case shows 
did not exist, even should such instructions contain cor-
rect statements of law/ Jensen v. Utah Railway Co., 
72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349, 358." (133 P.2d 333 at 
336). 
Similarly, in Olsen v. Warwood, supra, Justice McDon-
ough, speaking for this Honorable Court, said: 
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an in-
struction must be based on evidence, and that it is 
prejudicial error to submit a charged act . . . to a jury 
for its consideration in the absence of evidence tending 
to support a finding that the act occurred." (225 P.2d 
725 at 727). 
In the instant case, it cannot be said that there was evi-
dence tending to support a finding that the intervening plain-
tiff Bank was guilty of a violation of the Utah Uniform Securi-
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ties Act in failing and omitting to advise defendant-appellant 
of certain material information relating to the Universal Leas-
ing stock sought to be purchased by defendant-appellant. In 
point of fact, the testimony proffered during trial is quite con-
clusive that the intervening plaintiff Bank was not cognizant of 
any material information relating to the financial condition 
of Universal Leasing other than that provided to defendant-
appellant, and that the officers of the intervening plaintiff 
Bank repeatedly advised the defendant-appellant of the need 
for him to conduct a full and independent inquiry concerning 
the financial condition of Universal Leasing prior to the con-
summation of purchase of that company's stocks. The testi-
mony in this regard has been discussed in detail in Point I of 
this brief, and for reasons of brevity will not be repeated at 
this time. It is sufficient to state that the Souvalls were the 
sellers of the stock and that the Bank's participation was only 
incidental thereto. Any assertions to the contrary are unsup-
ported by the evidence. There was no evidentiary basis for an 
instruction by the Trial Court concerning the intervening 
plaintiff's alleged omission to provide material information to 
defendant-appellant. In point of fact, the testimony proferred 
at the trial clearly indicated that the officers of the Bank re-
peatedly advised defendant to obtain his own information about 
the stock. Since the Bank was neither the seller nor the seller's 
agent, the Trial Court had no reason to give an instruction con-
cerning the alleged omission of material facts, 
B. 
Defendant-appellant also argues in this section of his brief 
that the jury was prevented from finding that the Souvalls were 
liable under the Utah Uniform Securities Act because the 
Trial Court's instruction number 17 omitted to indicate to the 
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jury that liability under said Act can be predicted upon omis-
sions. This argument is extensively treated under Point III of 
this brief. 
C 
Defendant-appellant further contends in this section of 
his brief that certain enumerated instructions given by the Trial 
Court erroneously and incorrectly state the burden and ele-
ments of proof under the Utah Uniform Securities Act (See 
defendant-appellant's brief pp. 22-23), and that certain enum-
erated interrogatories further misrepresent the nature of the 
burden of proof required in the instant case (See defendant-ap-
pellant's brief pp. 24-26). Said instructions and interroga-
tories, defendant-appellant contends, may have misled the jury 
as to the elements and burden of proof sustained by the parties 
to the instant action, and were so erroneous as to make it im-
possible for defendant-appellant to receive a fair hearing on 
the issues. 
In response to defendant-appellant's argument, we are 
constrained of necessity to recite once again the well-establish-
ed rule that the propriety and correctness of individual instruc-
tions is not to be determined by considering those instructions 
in a vacuum, but by considering those challenged instructions 
in connection with other instructions that have been given by 
the Trial Court and considering the adequacy of the charge as 
a whole. Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Padgett, supra; Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra; Startin v. Madsen, supra; Wal-
kenhorst v. Kesler, supra; Redd v. Airway Motor Coachlines, 
supra; Brunson v. Strong, supra; Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co., 
supra. (See Point III for further elaboration of this well-estab-
lished point of law.) 
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In the instant case, the Trial Court provided a general in-
struction to the jury concerning the requirements and burden of 
proof as to the elements and issues of the case and provided, 
moreover, an instruction as to the meaning of the phrase "pre-
ponderance of the evidence." Those instructions are repro-
duced herein from the record of the proceedings in the instant 
case. 
Instruction Number Six provides: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that 
the burden, or the burden of proof, rests upon a certain 
party to prove a certain allegation made by him, the 
meaning of such an instruction is this: that unless the 
truth of that allegation is proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence, you shall find that the same is not 
true. If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its con-
vincing force on any allegation, you must find that such 
allegation has not been proved. 
Instruction Number Five provides: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means 
the greater weight of the evidence; that is, such evi-
dence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, is more 
convincing as to its truth. 
The above instructions clearly and fairly presented the 
nature and elements of proof and the burden of proof in the 
instant case. Defendant-appellant's contention that the jury 
might have been misled by other instructions in considering 
the elements and burden of proof is misconceived. 
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Further, even assuming arguendo, that there were any 
merit to defendant-appellant's contention that the challenged 
instructions were erroneous, it is well established in this juris-
diction that where it is apparent from the whole testimony 
that the verdict produced by the jury is correct on the merits, 
any error committed by the Trial Court in the giving of in-
structions is to be considered harmless. Broadbent v. Denver 
& Rio Grande R.R. Co., 48 Utah 598, 160 P. 1185 (1916); 
Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708 (1936); 
Dailey v. Salt Lake City and U.R. Co., 61 Utah 238, 247 P. 
293 (1926); Moore v. Utah and Idaho Central R. Co., 52 
Utah 373, 174 P. 873 (1918). 
From the record and transcript of the instant case, we 
submit that the verdict and decision of the jury is obviously 
correct on its merits and that the decision is substantiated and 
borne out conclusively by the testimony and evidence proffered 
at trial. As a result, even if there were merit to defendant-ap-
pellant's contentions (as there is not), this Court would not be 
justified in reversing the obviously correct verdict entered in 
the instant case. 
POINT V 
THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFEND-
ANTS C O U N T E R C L A I M FOR FRAUD 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND THE BANK. 
On motion of the plaintiffs and the intervenor, the Court 
dismissed the defendant's Counterclaims for fraud at the con-
clusion of the evidentiary phase of the trial because no proof 
of general or punitive damages was shown, but the Court per-
mitted the issues of fraud to be submitted to the jury as an 
affirmative defense (See written Order of September 21, 1971, 
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R. 190). Defendant asserts in his brief (Point V) that the 
ruling was erroneous because he had paid $9,000.00 on the 
contract under which the stock was purchased. For several 
reasons, there is no merit to defendant's contention on this 
point. 
Because defendant's Counterclaims were based on separate 
theories of fraud, i.e., common-law fraud against the Bank and 
statutory fraud against the Souvalls, the plaintiffs and interven-
er urged the Court to submit the issues of fact to the jury 
by means of special interrogatories (R. 185-188). The jury 
considered all of the interrogatories and found that neither the 
Bank (Interrogatories Nos. 11 through 16) nor the plaintiffs 
(Interrogatories Nos. 17 through 25) had defrauded the de-
fendant under any theory. Therefore, the jury answered all of 
the questions of fraud that could have been submitted to them 
in connection with his Counterclaim against the contentions 
of the defendant. In other words, the very questions that would 
have been submitted to the jury in connection with the Coun-
terclaims were fully answered on the affirmative defense. De-
fendant's assertions of fraud were rejected, and if the Counter-
claims had remained, they would necessarily have been dis-
missed by the Court. The jury's answers to the interrogatories 
on fraud mooted the question on appeal. Either way, the result 
must be the same — judgment against the defendant and for 
the plaintiffs and the Bank. 
The appellant's brief states that the defendant tendered 
back the equivalent of 10,000 shares of Universal Leasing 
stock to the Bank (P. 27). The evidence does not support 
this assertion. Defendant's agreement of purchase (Exhibit 
3-P) shows that the Universal Leasing Company stock could 
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be freely traded when it was delivered to the plaintiff. On 
page 4, paragraph 4 of the Exhibit, the Contract states that the 
buyer had received an opinion issued by Attorney Alexander 
Walker, Jr., giving reasons why previous restrictions on the 
sale of stock should be eliminated. (The lengthy opinion it-
self, dated March 20, 1970, was received in evidence as Ex-
hibit 32-P during the trial.) After that the stock could be 
traded freely. Since the evidence clearly shows that Mr. Hunter 
received the stock on March 25, 1970 (R. 342-4), he was free 
to trade it as he pleased when it came into his possession. After 
suit was filed in this action, the defendant brought to the 
Bank 5,188,000 shares of Universal Rockwell stock in the 
name of Don Timothy. This stock was registered, lettered stock 
that could not be freely traded like the stock he had received 
from the Bank (R. 737). Defendant asserts that this was a fair 
return even though he argued throughout the trial that the 
Universal Rockwell stock was worthless (R. 794-796). The 
tender was obviously inadequate. 
Hunter admitted that he had sold or otherwise disposed 
of a great bulk of the 4,530,000 shares of Universal Rockwell 
stock that had been exchanged for the Souvall shares of stock 
(R. 783-796). The agreed consideration on these sales was 
considerably more than $9,000.00, although Hunter's ability 
to collect was severely lacking. In one transaction he received 
a computer floor and an air-conditioner from Mark Eames in 
lieu of payment of $10,000.00 (R. 791-93). In addition 
Hunter received the inventory of the S & F Supply Co. as part 
of the purchase contract for the stock and other assets. The 
evidence further shows that he sold the inventory so obtained 
and retained the funds derived therefrom. This amount was 
considerably more than $9,000.00. 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C O N C L U S I O N 
The matters raised by the appellant on this appeal have 
no merit and are unsupported by the record made in the Trial 
Court. For this reason, the Judgment against the defendant 
S. Craig Hunter should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. NELSON DAY 
United States Attorney 
H. RALPH KLEMM 
Assistant United States Attorney 
200 U.S. Post Office & Courthouse 
350 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Intervening 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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Respondent, 400 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
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